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ABSTRACT
This article contributes to the growing literature on the impact of colonial legacies
on long-run development. We focus on Kenya, where it is previously argued that
land tenure and taxation policies created an impoverished class of wage workers
leading to lower living standards, high inequality, and stunted economic
development. We take issue with this interpretation. Using archival sources, we
map the rise of profitable settler agriculture. Next, we correlate settler
profitability with taxation and the development of African agriculture. Contrary
to previous studies, we find that labour came from areas that became increasingly
more commercialized. Thus, a decline in African livelihoods was not a necessary
pre-condition for the establishment of successful European settler agriculture.
Instead a restructuring of the settler agricultural sector coinciding with tightened
labour control policies can explain the increased profitability. An increased
cultivation of high-value crops raised the value of labour. Reductions of African
mobility lowered both the wage and transaction costs of finding and retraining
workers enabling the settlers to raise their profit share. Our finding calls for a
revision of the colonial legacy of European settler agriculture for long-term
economic and social development in Kenya.
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INTRODUCTION
It is widely agreed in the literature on Africa’s development that much of the con-
tinent’s past and present poverty can be explained by colonial institutions. The role
of extractive institutions is particularly evident in the historical research on settler
colonialism in Africa. Going through the literature, a consensus emerges that
African living standards declinedwith the arrival and expansion of European settle-
ment (see e.g. Arrighi 1970 on Southern Rhodesia, van Zwanenberg 1975 on
Kenya, and Bundy 1979 on South Africa). Living standards declined as the colonial
state intervened in the land and labour markets to ensure a steady supply of cheap
labour. Land alienation and the subsequent relocation of Africans to remote native
reserves with poor soil quality and limited opportunities for successful cash crop
cultivation led to the regression of African agriculture. With increased taxation,
Africans were left with no alternative but to work for European settlers for low
wages. A few scholars have questioned this interpretation arguing that access to
migrant labour from neighbouring countries played a more important role than
colonial policies (Mosley 1983; Bolt & Green 2015). For two decades the debate
on labour in settler economies went almost silent. Recently, however, the ‘consen-
sus’ interpretation of labour supply in settler economies has resurfaced in the
works of scholars examining the legacies of colonial rule in Africa. The attempts
by the colonial state to ensure cheap labour supplies to settlers caused long-
lasting negative impacts on human capital formation and economic development
in former settler economies (Bowden et al. 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2010).
In this article, we revisit the historical debate on labour in Africa’s settler econ-
omies by exploring the economic and political factors underlying the rise of settler
agriculture, with a focus on Kenya. Kenya is typically classified as a settler economy
as the Europeans had a share in government;2 but differently from the colonies in
southern Africa, the white population in Kenya did not have access to avast pool of
migrant labour. This makes Kenya a fascinating case to study, for how then did the
settler farmers manage to become successful? Was it due to repressive colonial pol-
icies aimed to create a surplus of local labour? To answer the question, we focus on
the decades in which settler agriculture shifted from being a financial weakness to
being a lucrative business c. 1920–45. Differently from previous literature on white
settlement and African living standards, we explicitly contrast settler profitability
with the introduction of various labour policies. To explore the link between
labour coercion and the expansion of settler agriculture we calculate settler farm
2 Mosley (1983: 5) defines a settler society as ‘a country partly settled by European landowner-pro-
ducers, who have a share in government, but who nonetheless remain a minority of the popu-
lation andwho in particular remain dependent, at least for labour, on the indigenous population’.
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earnings and African real wages. We estimate the real wages using Allen’s (2009,
2015) subsistence basket approach. In the past declining real wages have been
equatedwith increased labour coercion (see Arrighi 1970; Frankema & vanWaijen-
burg 2012); nevertheless, real wages could decline even when there is little or no
labour coercion. For instance, declining wages can be attributed to both low
labour productivity levels and contractions in the settler farm economy. We thus
account for changes in the settler farm economy by combining the real wage
series with an estimate of settler farm earnings. We calculate the earnings by deduct-
ing labour, production, transport, and transaction costs from the total value of
settler agricultural production. Our findings from the measures of settler earnings
and real wages confirm those in the literature: increased profitability coincided
with declining African real wages; yet, despite the decrease in wages, labour
supply to the European agricultural sector continued to increase.
At first glance, this finding reaffirms the consensus that the success of settler
agriculture was a direct function of colonial policies that indirectly, albeit intention-
ally, caused a decline in African livelihoods leading to unlimited labour supplies at
low wages. Analysing agrarian changes in the reserves we do, however, find that
African labour came from reserves that became increasingly more commercialized.
Despite the limitations imposed by colonial authorities on the Africans,3 wage
workers appear to have been in a better position to diversify their livelihood. In
other words, there is no evidence that a labour surplus was politically created by
increasing the opportunity costs of African commercial farming. Instead, it
appears that a combination of seasonality in agriculture and a deeper integration
of the African farmers into the cash economy ensured a steady labour supply.
This, nonetheless, does not portray a win-win situation for the African farmer
and the settler. The reliance on labour from nearby relatively commercial areas
created obstacles for the settlers. In agriculture more so than in industry, being
able to adjust for fluctuations in annual output by mobilizing accurate amounts
of labour on a short notice is key. The transaction costs of finding labour were
high as the settlers had to rely on expensive and inefficient recruiters (Berman &
Lonsdale 1980). Further, contract enforcement costs were high as workers would
often desert (Green 2013). The emergence of a labour control regime in the late
1910s enabled the settlers to gain more control over tenants and local wage
workers making it easier to raise the workload of tenants and to trace deserted
workers. The tightened labour control not only lowered transaction costs but also
reduced the competition among settlers, placing downward pressure on nominal
wages. In the same years, the settler agricultural sector was restructured towards
high-value cash crops such as coffee and tea, andwith the decline in direct and indir-
ect labour costs the settlers could raise their profit share.4 Our empirical
3 For instance, Africans were prohibited from cultivating high-value cash crops (e.g. coffee, tea,
and pyrethrum).
4 There is a rich literature on transaction costs and labour contracts in pre-industrial Europe; see
for instance Acemoglu & Wolitzky 2011; Domar 1970; Fenoaltea 1984.
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investigation offers an alternative explanation of the expansion of settler agriculture.
We conquer with the ‘classic’ interpretation of labour supply in Kenya. In doing so,
we also call for revisions to the literature on colonial legacies that claims that the
expansion of settler agriculture can explain contemporary high poverty rates. We
do not believe that these findings are unique for Kenya as similar measures were
taken to reduce labour mobility in for instance South Africa and Southern Rhodesia
(Rennie 1978; Nattrass 1991). Still, more research on labour control and settler prof-
itability is needed to further our understanding of the political economy of settler
farming in Africa but also to explore how European settlement affected the econ-
omic opportunities and freedoms of the African populations.
SETTLER AGRICULTURE AND ACCESS TO LABOUR
To establish profitable enterprises, settler farmers in colonial Africa needed access to
fertile land and labourerswilling to workon farms.While most of the landwas occu-
pied and therefore demanded ‘negotiations’ with the indigenous elites, it was the
question of labour supply that posed the greatest challenge for the settler farmers.
To understand how settler agriculture expanded, we have to examine how the set-
tlers managed to solve the ‘labour problem’. According to the first strand of litera-
ture on labour supply in settler Africa, it was combinations of market forces and
seasonality that ensured a steady labour supply at low wages. Fluctuations in
labour demand allowed Africans to increase total income by temporarily transfer-
ring labour to the European sector without threatening their own farming oper-
ations (Barber 1960). However, in the late 1960s–1970s, a ‘radical’ interpretation
of the underlying mechanisms behind labour supply in the southern settler econom-
ies emerged. The seminal works by Arrighi (1966, 1970) inspired a new strain of lit-
erature arguing that not market forces but political mechanisms were behind the
witnessed labour supply at low wages. Initially, African commercial farmers
played a critical role in supplying food to the growing mining sector in Southern
Rhodesia and South Africa, creating labour shortages. Legislative and administra-
tive action was taken to create a class of impoverishedwage workers. Taxation alone
could not solve the labour problem as the African farmer could obtain cash by
selling produce to the market. So to increase the supply of African labour, the set-
tlers successfully lobbied for land tenure policies such as the establishment of labour
reserves and a reduction in the size of land available to the Africans. Thereafter,
Africans were gradually relocated to the so-called ‘native reserves’ (or ‘homelands’
as in the case of South Africa) located in less fertile areas where landwas typically of
lower quality. The aim of the policies were, to quote Austin (2016: 317–318), ‘to
restrict African land rights (whether owners, or even as tenants on European-
owned land) in the hope of driving the majority of the population out of the
produce markets and into the labour market’. These reserves soon became overpo-
pulated and with the extensive nature of African agriculture this led to declining
average agricultural yields. In other words, the combination of taxation and land
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tenure policies became a precondition for the establishment and expansion of settler
agriculture (see also Cohen 1976; Bundy 1979; Phimister 1988). This classic
interpretation of colonial institutions, labour supply, and real wages is depicted in
Figure 1. The influx of settlers and the subsequent rise of large-scale farming
shifted the demand curve outwards from D1 to D2 raising real wages from w1 to
w2 and labour supply from l1 to l2. In settler economies (unlike the peasant econom-
ies), the colonial authorities intervened to lower the pressure on wages. The men-
tioned land tenure policies and the increase in taxation shifted the supply curve
outwards from S1 to S2 leading to a higher labour supply l3 at lower real wages w1.
The early works on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa influenced the histor-
iography of colonial Kenya and scholars noted the many similarities between the
colonies.5 Just as in the southern African colonies, so too did land tenure policies
and taxation facilitate the creation of a labour surplus in Kenya. To quote Palmer
and Parsons (1977: 243): ‘Thus by the end of the 1930s, the agricultural economy
of the Shona and the Ndebele, like that of the Kikuyu and most South African
peoples, had been destroyed.’ Despite a general agreement that extra-economic
measures played an important role in solving the labour problem there is controversy
on the degree of coercion applied by the state to solve the labour problem. On one
end of the spectrum, Wasserman (1974) and van Zwanenberg (1975) maintain that
illegal recruitment, forced labour, taxation, and land tenure policies were used in as
late as 1950 to force Africans toworkon settler farms. Other studies note that the use
of forceful labour coercion declined in the 1920s. By then a deliberate neglect by the
colonial administrators of African agriculture and a general favouritism of settler
Figure 1: The impact of colonial policies on African labour supply and real wages
Note: Inspired by Frankema & van Waijenburg 2012.
5 Key works include Clayton & Savage 1975; van Zwanenberg 1975; Stichter 1982; Mosley 1983 ;
Berman & Lonsdale 1992.
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agriculture was enough to guarantee a labour supply (Brett 1973; Clayton & Savage
1975; Stichter 1982). Without making a distinct connection to the expansion of
settler agriculture, few scholars note that forceful labour coercion was replaced by
a labour control regime that made it easier to restrain and discipline workers
(Berman & Lonsdale 1980; Anderson 2000). On the other end of the spectrum, a
few ‘liberal’ scholars have sought to nuance the debate by emphasizing the role of
non-political factors in ensuring sufficient amounts of labour. Mosley (1983)
offered a detailed empirical account of the development of both African and
settler agriculture in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya. The study concluded that
labour coercion was used to the mid-1920s, but thereafter, the gap between labour
demand and supply was filled by the private recruitment of workers from poorer
parts of the colonies and by increasing the engagement of female and juvenile
labour (see also Bolt & Green 2015, who reach a similar conclusion on settler agri-
culture in Nyasaland). According to Mosley, land tenure policies did not cause a
regression of African agriculture. On the contrary, Mosley (1983) notes that
certain African reserves experienced ‘Boserupian’ growth, with their yields and
population densities reporting positive correlations. The debate on settler agriculture
and labour went silent for almost two decades; however, recently, the ‘radical’
interpretation has resurfaced in the New Institutional Economics andAfrican Econ-
omic History literature that tries to explain long-run developments in Africa. In the
settler economies, the deliberate attempts by the colonial state to shift the labour
supply-curve outward created ‘dual economies’ with persistent high levels of
inequality and stunted economic development (Austin 2008; Bowden et al. 2008;
Acemoglu et. al. 2001, 2010; Frankema & van Waijenburg 2012).
The contemporary literature reveals a need for re-examining the underlying
mechanisms carefully before drawing conclusions on long-run development in
settler societies. There are several weaknesses in the past research that has inspired
this paper. Apart from Mosley (1983) none of the works mentioned explicitly study
the development of the settler economy. By applying a narrow focus on labour
supply, the studies are not able to convincingly tie the introduction of various
labour policies to the expansion of settler agriculture. We do not know if the
decline in African real wages that Arrighi (1966, 1970) finds is due to labour coer-
cion or contractions of the settler economy. Further, while Arrighi convincingly
demonstrated significant theoretical depth, he offered limited empirical evidence
in support of his conclusions. To elaborate, Arrighi relied on maize figures to
argue the decline of African agriculture. This is problematic as it hides any indigen-
ous attempts to shift to cash crop farming. Mosley (1983) highlighted these con-
cerns and offered alternative explanations for the development of settler
agriculture, yet, his study suffers from shortcomings related to admittedly weak
data. Two data points (1932, 1948) are used to support the hypothesis that
African agricultural development followed a Boserupian path. Only a few of the
districts included in his analysis (30% of the total sample) yields a positive relation-
ship between population pressure and yields, as pointed out by Choate (1984).
More severely, Mosley lacks data to support the key argument that recruited
Labour control and the establishment of profitable settler agriculture in colonial Kenya, c. 1920–45
77
labour could close the gap between supply and demand after the 1920s. The
strength of the present study lies in its consideration of both settler and African
agricultural development. Further, instead of limiting our analysis to one crop,
we use newly collected district-level data on African agriculture.
In the following sections, we first analyse the development of settler agriculture
and then discuss the role of labour coercion.
ESTABLISHMENT OF PROFITABLE SETTLER
AGRICULTURE IN KENYA
The history of European settlement in Kenya began in the early 1890s with the con-
struction of the Uganda Railway that connected Lake Victoria to the coast of
Kenya. Due to the high maintenance costs of the railway, the British government
began encouraging large-scale settler agriculture to increase earnings. The settler
farming community comprised three fundamentally different groups: financially
strong settlers often of aristocratic origins, smaller and capital-scarce families
with farm holdings that accounted for the vast majority of farms, and a few capi-
talized European companies mainly cultivating plantation crops such as sisal.
Sector performance
In the first two decades of European settlement, Kenya heavily relied on the mono-
cropping of cereal crops such as maize and wheat, leading to low export values. In
the early 1920s, however, the sector was restructured such that more settlers began
cultivating high-value crops (e.g. coffee and tea). In addition, increasing areas were
cultivated during this period, which has been referred to as the ‘Golden Age’ of
European agriculture.6
From 1920 to 1930, the sector more than tripled its export earnings with an
increase from £669,028 to £2,763,707 (Kenya Colony 1920–30, 1930). To better
understand the effect of expansion in acreage and export on profitability, we esti-
mate the gross annual earnings for the entire sector. We calculate the settler farm
earnings by deducting depreciation expenses of agricultural machinery and
annual labour, fertilizer, transport, and other transaction costs from the annual
agricultural production values (Figure 2). For further elaboration on data and
methods, see Appendix 1, 2, 4, and 5. We consider estimating the annual wage
bill to be the most challenging task because wages accounted for the largest
share of production costs. To determine annual wage costs, we reference the
Kenyan archival sources for detailed employment data on the three forms of agri-
cultural labour: tenants, monthly paidworkers, and casual labour. A majority of the
wage data for tenant and monthly paid labour are available in the administrative
6 See Tignor 1976 and Mosley 1983.
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records. As is often the case with colonial statistics, the data points for female and
juvenile labour are few. We interpolate data in the case of missing values. Assuming
all workers received the stated minimum wage, we expect our wage bill to slightly
overestimate the true labour costs, particularly since secondary sources have indi-
cated that minimum wages were not always enforced (see Kenya Colony 1935;
Kitching 1977).
To examine the validity of our measure, we searched for officially reported
annual wage bills. The Statistical Abstract (SA) began reporting agricultural
wage bills in the 1950s. If we extend our time series, the estimated wage bill
comes fairly close to the reported bill, with a mean difference of 1% and a
maximum difference of 10% (Kenya Colony 1957–60).7 Another data limitation
is that the total production values were inconsistently reported in the administrative
records. The records indicate the production values for main crops including maize,
coffee, and wheat (roughly 60% of the total production value) but only the export
values for the remaining crops such as sugar and tea. To implement a solution,
Figure 2: Earnings in the European agricultural sector in pounds, 1920–45
Sources: Authors’ own calculations. Production and export values are taken from the Agricultural Department annual
report 1920–45; Employment and wages are taken from the Native Affairs Department, Labour Department annual
reports 1920–45 and from Mosley (1983); Import values are taken from the Annual Trade Reports 1920–45.
Notes: The preferred measure uses production values for coffee, maize, and wheat and export values (deducted by 15%
to take into account transaction costs) for sisal, tea, sugar, potatoes, cotton, and coconuts to calculate revenue. Our
robustness check use data on export values only deducted by 15% to take into account transaction costs. In both
cases, we deduct curing charges from coffee values.
7 For 1956, 1957, and 1958, our wage bills are £676,697, £873,118, and £402,521 greater than the
SA-estimated £7,800,000, £8,400,000, and £8,700,000, respectively. On the other hand, for 1959
and 1960, our wage bills are £93,513 and £452,904 lower than the £8,600,000 and £10,000,000
estimated by SA.
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we use production values where available. For the crops where we lack production
values, we follow Bolt and Green (2015) and use export values to proxy production
values. We deduct a mark-up of 15% from the export values based on the trans-
action costs of exporting coffee and sisal to arrive at production values.8 In per-
forming a robustness check, we calculate earnings using the deducted export
values only. The robustness check shows that the use of export values slightly under-
estimates true earnings due to the inability to capture earnings from crops sold
domestically. Our measure is therefore a conservative measure of true earnings.
Figure 2 shows that the expansion in acreage and exports increased earnings. In
the early 1920s, the sector transitioned from being a low-income sector to a profit-
able one. We observe an upward trend in profitability. The sector was, nonetheless,
vulnerable to fluctuations in international demand and following the contraction of
the global economy in 1920–21 and during the years of the Great Depression we see
a decline in earnings mainly driven by lower coffee prices.
Labour and profitability
Having pinpointed the rise in profitable settler agriculture, in this section we explore
the reasons underlying the expansion of earnings. First, we measure land and labour
productivity in the years for which data are available. We estimate land productivity
at the sectoral level for coffee and maize. Ideally, we would calculate labour pro-
ductivity at sectoral level; however, the limited employment data available
prevent us from doing so. Thus, instead, we calculate a ‘rough’ measure of the
value of output per worker for the entire sector. To proxy real changes in labour pro-
ductivity, we deflate our output series by the coffee price index as coffee was the
main export commodity. As shown in Figure 3, land productivity marginally
improved for coffee from 297lb of clean coffee per acre in 1920 to 314lb in 1946
(Figure 3). Maize yields per acre fluctuated around a mean of 1242lb per acre
(approximately 6 bags) with no upward trend (Kenya Colony 1920–63).9 Labour
productivity, on the other hand, did increase in the period and Figure 4 shows
that increased settler profitability was largely driven by higher output per worker.
The shift to high-value cash crops such as coffee increased output per worker,
attracting greater settler investments in agriculture. Consequently, more land was
put under cultivation: in particular, land for coffee plantation alone significantly
increased from 33,813 acres in 1921 to 96,042 acres in 1930 (Kenya Colony
1920–30). This shift warranted a simultaneously large increase in the number of
labourers employed. The Labour Commission (1927) estimated that a coffee
estate of 100 acres needed 45 full-time workers (and 80 workers during the peak
8 The 15% mark-up is based on the sea freight and insurance costs of exporting coffee and sisal to
London. The mark-up overestimates the costs of crops sold nationally or within the region.
9 Yields are calculated using data on the production of clean coffee by Europeans and the Euro-
pean coffee acreages.
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Figure 3: Land productivity for coffee and maize (measured as yields in lb per acre), 1921–44
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Data is taken from the Agricultural Department annual reports 1921–44.
Note: Yields are calculated using data on European production of clean coffee and maize and European coffee and maize
acreages.
Figure 4: Labour productivity index measured as output per worker for the entire settler agricultural
sector (deflated by coffee price index), 1920–45
Source: Production, export values, and coffee prices are taken from the Agricultural Department annual report 1920–45;
Employment and wages are taken from the Native Affairs Department and Labour Department annual reports 1920–45
and from Mosley 1983.
Notes: Labour productivity is calculated by dividing an index of value of output (deflated by a coffee price index) by the
index of total employment in agriculture. The total employment measure includes both wage workers and tenants.
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season), whereas maize required only six workers per 100 acres (and an additional
six during harvest). This clearly demonstrates the importance of labour access to
the expansion of settler agriculture. In the case of coffee production, estimated
labour demand increased from 15,216 permanent workers (and 27,050 additional
workers during harvest) in 1921 to 43,510 permanent workers (and 77,351
additional workers during harvest) in 1930. Evidently, labour supply responded
favourably to the increase in demand. From 1920 to 1945, the average number of
monthly paid workers in agriculture considerably increased from 53,709 to
118,300 (Kenya Colony 1920–45a). It is likely that the actual number of workers
employed was even higher because the employment statistics were based on
labour returns submitted irregularly by employers (Tignor 1976; Mosley 1983).
ROLE OF LABOUR COERCION
African real wages
The increased output per worker should have, ceteris paribus, led to higher wages.
When there is little or no government intervention in the labour market, we expect
real wages to equal the marginal product of labour. In our first step to understanding
the role of labour coercion in expanding the settler agricultural sector, we calculate
African real wages using Allen’s (2009, 2013) subsistence basket approach. The
approach divides an adult worker’s annual incomeby the costs of a family subsistence
basket and expresses real wages as awelfare ratio. Prior to the consolidation of wages
in the late 1950s, the value of free meals and housing constituted a large part of the
total wage. To take this into account, we follow the literature, and include value of
rations in the total income measure. Due to lack of data, we are not able to
include the value of housing and our total income measure slightly underestimates
true income. For further elaboration on welfare ratio, see Figure 5 and Appendix 3.
Awelfare ratio of one indicates that theworker and his family are barely surviving,
whereas a ratio greater than one suggests that the family lives above the subsistence
level. Still, themeasure is subject to an important caveat: it assumes that an agricultural
worker was a full-time employee. By contrast, agricultural workers in Kenyawere gen-
erally employed under contracts of 3–6 months (Economic & Finance Committee
1923). For that reason, we do not expect the measure to adequately estimate the
actual living standards for wage workers and their families. Instead, we use the
measure as a proxy of the development of the purchasing power of wages.
Real wages were the highest in the first decade of settler agriculture develop-
ment, with awelfare ratio of 2.72 in 1914 (Figure 5). In fact, this ratio was relatively
high at an international level and was almost at par with the urban welfare ratios of
Ghana (Accra) and Sierra Leone (Freetown).10 Yet, a general trend during the
period was the stickiness of nominal wages and the rise in rural prices, which
10 See Frankema and van Waijenburg 2012.
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caused real wages to decline first and then remain stagnant. More specifically,
during the period 1912–45 the welfare ratio of a worker and his family was margin-
ally greater than one (the mean was 1.38), indicating limited welfare gains from
employment. This trend could possibly indicate that policies aimed at increasing
labour supply became more coercive over time, forcefully creating a labour
surplus large enough to ensure unlimited supplies of labour at low wages.
Taxation
To investigate the level of coercion, we first analyse Kenya’s taxation policies. In
1902, all African Kenyans were obligated to pay a hut tax, a uniform tax payable
by the owner of a hut. If a male older than 16 years did not own a hut, he was
required to pay a poll tax of the same amount instead. To determine the effect of
taxation on labour supply, we calculate the per capita tax pressure for the bench-
mark years of 1915, 1920, and 1930 by dividing the annual direct tax by the
daily wage of a rural male worker.11 In 1915, a rural male worker was required
Figure 5: Welfare ratio – based on the annual income of an adult male agricultural worker, 1912–45
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Wages are taken from the Blue Books 1912–30, Native Affairs Department 1930–45,
and Mosley 1983. Rural commodity prices are taken from the Central/Kikuyu and Nyanza Province annual reports
1912–45. Prices for imported are taken from the Blue Books and Trade Reports 1912–45.
Notes: (1) Standard methods are used to calculate the welfare ratio (see Frankema &Waijenburg 2012; Allen 2013; de
Haas 2017). (2) Caloric content is taken from Latham 1997. (3) Similar to de Haas (2017), we include beans and we
allow the family to choose the cheapest grains variety (maize, millet or sorghum). Following Frankema and van Waijen-
burg (2012), we add 10% to the cost of the basket to take into account firewood/charcoal and candles, as data for these
items is missing. In addition, a 5% mark-up is also added to account for the cost of maintaining a rural dwelling.
11 We adopt the direct tax level from Mosley 1983 and Berman and Lonsdale 1980 and calculate
daily rural wages by dividing the official 30-day ticket wage by 30 days.
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to work 11 days to incur annual taxes. In 1920, the required workdays remarkably
increased to 60 days. In 1922, a few years before the development of the settler
farming sector, colonial authorities decided to reduce the hut/poll tax from 16 to
12 Ksh., which was maintained throughout the inter-war period (Kenya Colony
1920–45b). As a result, in 1930, the tax pressure declined to 23 days.
Still, per capita tax pressure does not provide a complete overview of taxation
for the following three reasons. First, the decline in tax pressure could have been
offset by efforts to enhance the enforcement of tax payments. Second, differential
local tax rates could have been used to increase tax pressure in labour-supplying
areas. Finally, indirect taxes might have raised the overall tax burden. The colonial
administration constantly debated ways to achieve more ‘efficient’ tax collection
systems and methods, such as having chiefs or settler farmers collect taxes (van
Zwanenberg 1975). In 1923, shortly before the expansion of settler agriculture,
the total value of direct African taxation was £575,000, but by 1928, the value
had dropped to £564,000 and further to £530,000 during the Great Depression in
1935 (ibid). This alludes to a population decline, widespread tax evasion, or a
decline in the sales of produce making it harder to generate income. In general,
the national tax rate applied to ethnic groups throughout the colony, although
there were a few exemptions. The colonial officers initially believed the Masaai
people to be wealthy; thus, they were required to pay a higher tax of 20 Ksh.
Despite the higher taxes, the Masaai people generally did not work on settler
farms (Stichter 1982). Few groups residing in less developed districts, mainly on
the coast and in northern Kenya, paid a lower rate of 6–8 Ksh. A majority of the
Africans, including ethnic groups that supplied labour paid a uniform rate of 12
Ksh. No indirect tax was levied on locally produced goods during this period.
Custom tariffs did apply to goods imported into the colony, although we find no
systematic trend for changes in the tariffs. In 1931, an increased duty was
imposed on imported luxury goods such as vehicles, tea, ale, and beer, items
which were mostly consumed by Europeans. Three years later, the tariff on textiles
and bicycles increased, which may have impacted the African population. There
was no further increase in the tariffs in the subsequent years (Kenya Colony
1920–45b). The decrease in tax level in 1921 may have caused a temporary drop
in labour supply given the reported shortages in 1923 and 1924. Nevertheless,
any effect on labour was short-lived and despite the increase in tariffs on textiles
and bicycles, no shortage was reported in the remaining years (Kikuyu Province
1920–37), indicating a rather weak link between labour supply and taxation.
Type and origin of labour
As argued in previous research, taxation alone was insufficient to make Africans work
for lowwages. Produce sales suppliedAfricanswith sufficient cash to pay taxes. In fact,
it was the combination of taxes and a politically induced decline in African agriculture
that facilitated the workforce expansion. This section explores the linkages between
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labour supply and the development of the African agricultural economy. We begin by
examining the origin of workers employed on settler farms. According to Figure 6,
short-term wage workers and tenants accounted for a majority of the labour force,
although the share of migrant workers seemed to decline.12
A majority of the tenants were from the populous Kikuyu reserves;13 for
instance, roughly two-thirds of the tenants were from Kiambu and Fort Hall (Leys
Figure 6: Labour composition on European farms, 1928–37
Sources: Data on tenant and short-term workers is taken from the Agricultural census 1928-1937. The number of long-
term workers (referred to as ‘contracted workers’ in the colonial records) is taken from the Native Affairs Department
annual reports 1928-1934; for 1931, 1935. For 1936 the source is Fearn 1961.
Notes: (1) For 1931, 1935, and 1936, we only have data on long-term workers from the Nyanza Province. This should
not cause interfere with our results and conclusions, as the vast majority of long-term workers came from the Nyanza
Province. (2) Due to lack of data, the number of tenant labourers is interpolated using a log-linear approach for the years
1930, 1931, 1935, and 1937. (3) Tenant workers are not reported separately from wage workers before 1927 (Mosley
1983). We are therefore not able to extend our time-series back. Another concern is the manner in which long-term
workers are recorded: these are reported as ‘contracted labour’ but the administrative reports do not distinguish
between contracted labour in industry and in agriculture. Thus, we might be overestimating the role of migrant
labour slightly. This does not affect our conclusion, that short-term and tenant labourers were the most important
sources of labour.
12 The literature on labour in Kenya referred to short-term workers as ‘casual labour’, ‘short-term
migrant labour’, and ‘migrant labour’ (see van Zwanenberg 1975; Stichter 1977, 1982). To avoid
confusion, we define workers on 30-day ticket contracts as ‘short-term wage workers’, workers
employed under long-term contracts of more than six months as ‘long-term wage workers’ or
‘migrant labour’, andworkers hired on a daily basis (e.g. coffee pickers) as ‘casual workers’. The
colonial administration first began segregating tenants from wage workers in 1928; thus, accu-
rate data are available for a few years.
13 Meru, Embu, and Nyeri were also a part of the Kikuyu reserves, although these regions pro-
vided fewer tenants.
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1975; Tignor 1976; Stichter 1982; Kanogo 1987). Kikuyu tenants settled on Euro-
pean farms in the Central Province and farms in Nakuru and Laikipia in the Rift
Valley Province. The remaining one-third belonged to the Kamba and Nandi
ethnic groups that lived in close proximity to remote farms in Uasin Gishu and
TransNzoia in the northern region of theRiftValley (Stichter 1982). The other domi-
nant labour pool comprised short-term workers who were employed on a monthly
basis and would generally work 2–6 months a year. Similar to tenants, a majority
of thewageworkerswere fromKikuyu reserves (seeKenyaColony 1928–45; Stichter
1982). Further, while short-termworkers and tenants came from areas close to Euro-
pean farms, long-termworkersweremigrants from the Luo andLuhya ethnic groups
in the Nyanza Province of western Kenya (Figure 7). Year-long labour requirements
were higher for sisal and tea than for coffee; consequently, migrant workers would
seek employment in these sectors (Fearn 1961).
Labour supply and the African agricultural economy
To further our discussion on labour coercion, we examine the trends in African agri-
culture. Unlike Tanganyika and Uganda, data on African agriculture in Kenya are
rather scarce. Kenya’s national administrative records contain almost no data on
production prior to the 1930s, when colonial officers began reporting a few esti-
mates on African production. The export values of African agriculture are available
from 1922 and increased from £176,000 in 1922 to £447,495 in 1945 (Kenya Colony
1922–24; 1935–45).14 Maize was mainly produced in the labour-supplying Nyanza
and Kikuyu reserves and its export value increased from £73,000 in 1922 to
£100,000 in 1925. However, the national records do not offer regional-level data.
To capture regional-level trends, we carefully examine province- and district-level
annual reports. In the remainder of this section, we calculate the average earnings
from sales of produce per household. Positive earnings indicate that, on average,
families produced more food items than needed for their own consumption.
Further, we examine if earnings were sufficient to pay taxes (during this period,
the tax level was 12 Ksh. per hut). Low and/or declining earnings will lend
support to the standard interpretation of labour supply in settler economies. On
the other hand, earnings greater than the tax level indicate that farmers worked
for wages, not out of necessity, but to enhance the possibilities for household con-
sumption. We first examine Nyanza Province, the area which supplied migrant
workers.
In Nyanza, maize was the most important food and cash crop, followed by
hide, groundnuts, and sesame. In 1922, income from agricultural produce sales
was merely 4 Ksh. per household, which was a significantly low value to levy the
annual tax. Nevertheless, we see an upward trend in earnings thereafter. In 1935,
14 Few scholars have referenced this increase in export values to argue that African agriculture did
not decline in Kenya (see Berman & Lonsdale 1980; Mosley 1983).
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Figure 7: Administrative map of Kenya
Source: ILO (1972) ‘Employment, incomes and equality’
Note:▭ Main labour supplying area.
Labour control and the establishment of profitable settler agriculture in colonial Kenya, c. 1920–45
87
the average earnings per household increased to 7 Ksh. per household, further
increasing to 19 Ksh. in 1940 and 21 Ksh. in 1945.15 From 1936, on average,
income was sufficient to pay taxes. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to
further disaggregate earnings. We note that the rise in income was driven by the
sale of maize and hide, products which were also produced in labour-supplying
areas in central and north Nyanza. Low agricultural earnings reported in the
1920s combined with the pressures to pay taxes could explain the migrant labour
supply until the mid-1930s. Migrant workers, nevertheless, accounted for a small
and declining fraction of the total labour supply (around 10%).
Next, we explore the agricultural economy of the Kikuyu reserves, which, by
far, had supplied the largest share of labour. Initially, the main crops grown for con-
sumption and sales in the reserves were maize, potatoes, and beans, of which maize
was the dominant crop (Kikuyu Province 1929–30). The first consistent estimates of
sales for food items were reported from 1927. Unfortunately, we lack total earnings
from agricultural products sales. If we examine maize, in 1927,16 40,000 tons of
maize was exported with high per capita earnings of 6.25 Ksh. Yet, if we
examine the years leading up to the Great Depression, it is possible to paint a
picture of a decline in Kikuyu agriculture. No sale of food items from the
Kikuyu reserves was reported in 1929 and 1930. The literature (e.g. Brett 1973;
Stichter 1982) has suggested that colonial policies that systematically favoured
European over African producers or the outmigration of labour led to the
decline in sales. By contrast, the administrative reports attributed the decline
to unfavourable weather conditions and locust outbreaks (Kikuyu Province
1928–29). Available empirical evidence has indicated that the drop in sales was,
in fact, transitory. In 1932, a detailed economic survey of the Kikuyu reserves
was conducted by the District Commissionaire of Kiambu. According to Fazan
(1932), maize production recovered total sales amounting to 36,905 tons and a cor-
responding value of 101,489 pounds. As Table 1 shows, contrary to assumptions
made in the literature, household income from produce sales was higher in the
labour-supplying areas (Kiambu and Fort Hall) and earnings were sufficient to
pay the annual taxes.
The case of wattle bark production best illustrates agricultural development in
Kikuyu. Today, wattle bark is considered a minor raw material in the leather indus-
try.17 However, at the time, households used it as firewood and building material
and importantly, sold it as a cash crop for exports (Kikuyu Province 1932).
Wattle bark production in the Kikuyu reserves reported a take-up rate of as high
15 These values are calculated using the population and agricultural sales data from the annual
reports of Nyanza Province. African population data in the colonial era are subject to numerous
limitations (Frankema & Jerven 2014); as a result, our estimates may also suffer the same biases.
We use the official number of household members reported in the census data in Nyanza’s
annual reports (3.23 members on average).
16 See Kenya Colony (1927) (Kikuyu Province, 1934-48)
17 Extracts from wattle bark are used as a tanning agent to produce leather from skin and hide.
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as 75% of households in Kiambu, Fort Hall, and Nyeri (Cowen 1978). Similar to
food production, a majority of wattle bark production was done in areas with
high labour force participation rates (Table 2). This pattern of high participation
rates in the labour market and investments in wattle bark production lasted
throughout the colonial period. Data from the 1960 Sample Census of African
Agriculture show that 30 years later, Kiambu continued to report the highest
share of wattle-producing households (47.6% compared to Embu’s 3.1%) (Kenya
Colony 1960).18
To carefully analyse the importance of wattle bark to Kikuyu households, we
estimate the earnings per household (Table 3) using the population data from
wattle-producing districts in the Kikuyu reserves (i.e. Kiambu, Fort Hall, and
Nyeri). We deduct associated labour costs because of the use of hired labour to
strip the tree barks, as mentioned in Stichter (1982) and Cowen (1975). It is possible
that the resultant true income is underestimated because we assume that all house-
holds producedwattle, whereas in reality, about two-thirds of the households did so.
The estimates reveal rather low earnings from the wattle sales in the export
Table 1: Estimated average value of total produce per household in the Kikuyu Proper Native
Reserves, 1932
Value of produce per HH
Per household in: Consumed (Sh.) Sold (Sh.) Total (Sh.)
Kiambu 121 107 228
Fort Hall 139 52 191
Nyeri Native 160 28 188
Source: Kenya Land Commission 1934 – CAB/24/248
Table 2: Acreage under wattle bark and labour force participation rates in Kikuyu Province by district
in 1930
Area Wattle bark acreages in 1930
Labour force participation rate in 1930
(percentage of able-bodied males)
Kiambu 6,119 69.0%
Fort Hall 448 35.4%
Nyeri 120 36.6%
Embu and Meru 1 Embu: 15.7% and Meru: 25.9%
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Wattle bark acreages are taken from the Agricultural Census 1930.
Data on population and employment is taken from the Native Affairs Department annual report 1930.
18 In the 1950s, the production of wattle bark was replaced with that of other cash crops such as
coffee, tea, and pyrethrum.
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market.19 Nevertheless, these earnings were sufficiently large to impact labour
supply as, on average, households in labour-supplying areas earned sufficient
income from produce sales to be able to pay taxes.
Table 3: Estimated wattle bark earnings per household 1929–45
Year
African produced wattle
bark in Kikuyu Province
Estimated wattle bark
earnings per household
Nominal 30-day wage for a
male worker in agriculture
Export value in pounds Value in shillings Value in shillings
1929 35,000 6.5 8–12
1930 42,000 20.1 12
1931 72,521 14.1 13
1932 78,810 22.5 10
1933 46,600 12.2 6–10
1934 51,658 14.5 6–12
1935 44,570 11.5 9
1936 48,748 19.3 6–12
1937 45,483 13.3 11
1938 29,357 4.8 8–12
1939 72,846 14.6 8–12
1945 89,448 15.1 10–16
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Wattle bark figures are taken from the Native Affairs Department annual
report 1938–1948. Years 1936 and 1937 are taken from the Central Province annual report. Nominal
wages 1929, 1930, 1933, 1934, 1936, 1938, and 1939 are taken from the Native Affairs Department
annual reports. 1931, 1932, 1935, and 1937 are taken from Mosley (1983). Population data is taken from
the Kikuyu Province annual reports except for years 1925, 1938, and 1939 where data is taken from the
Native Affairs Department annual report.
Notes: (1) To calculate earnings per household we use the total population of the wattle bark producing
districts Kiambu, Fort Hall, and Nyeri. We obtain estimates of household size from S.H. Fazan’s 1932
economic survey of Kikuyu proper (CAB/24/248 Kenya Land Commission Evidence, I, 979) (2) To
estimate the costs of hired labour, we assume that 10 trees could be stripped per day per household (see
United Nations 1977). We further assume that a farmer would have a maximum of 100 trees. 100 trees
per farmer seems reasonable, as Fazan (1932) estimates that households would plant between 0.11 to
0.37 acres of wattle and we know from colonial Natal, that one acre could have around 400–450 trees
(Sherry 1971). It follows, that a household would need to hire labour for 10 days to strip bark. To calculate
the costs of hired labour, we assign the lowest daily agricultural wage to the number of workdays. (3)
Population figures are unusually high for 1931 causing a drop in earnings. The high population rate could
be due to a mistake in the colonial recordings.
19 The export values for wattle bark remained fairly stable over the period, while the population
size increased by 2%, creating downward pressure on household earnings from the crop (Kenya
Colony 1920–45a).
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Another indicator of increased commercialization in the labour-supplying
areas is the growth in African-owned shops in the 1920s. In Fort Hall alone, the
number of shops increased by almost 70% (from 144 to 208) during 1927–28
(Kikuyu Province 1928). The pattern of agricultural investments and commerciali-
zation in the Kikuyu reserves persisted for several decades. The cultivation of per-
manent crops is typically considered a suitable indicator for agricultural
investments and thus, a sign of progress. In 1960, 12% of Kikuyu reserves were
under cultivation for permanent crops in comparison to the limited 1.4% in
Nyanza. These values highlight stark intra-reserve diversities: in Kiambu, the
labour-supplying Kikuyu reserve, 38% of the land was under cultivation for perma-
nent crops, whereas in Embu andMeru, areas which supplied less labour, the rate of
land under cultivation was merely 5 and 7%, respectively (Kenya Colony 1960).
These findings pose an important question: if commercialization was on the
rise, why did farmers work on European estates? Low earnings combined with
the need to pay taxes could explain part of the labour supply for migrant
workers. For the bulk of labour, however, the answer probably lies in a combination
of seasonality and deeper integration in the cash economy. The agricultural calen-
dar for crops grown in Kikuyu suggests that labour could be freed from smallholder
agriculture during the peak coffee season from late October to January (Table 4).
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION
Policies to shift the labour supply-curve outward do not appear to have played a
role in the expansion of settler agriculture in Kenya. Instead, we grant support to
the previous literature noting that the ability to control available labour was
more important. This section explains the role that tightened labour control
played in lowering both wages and transaction costs allowing the settler to raise
their profit share. Settler farmers were faced with numerous challenges. The cultiva-
tion of mono-cereal crops such as maize andwheat was not profitable because of the
high transport costs (Tignor 1976; Mosley 1983). At the same time, capital was
costly. Since settlers operated in a high-risk environment, they preferred labour-
intensive production methods even for large estates (Mosley 1983). Initially, both
wages and the transaction costs of seeking and retaining workers were high. Settlers
had to pay high fees to costly and inefficient private recruiters (Berman & Lonsdale
1980). Further, contract enforcement costs were high as workers would often desert.
These costs were brought down with the introduction of two new laws. In the late
1910s, shortly before the European sector expanded, two policies that limited
African mobility and raised the workload of the tenants were introduced, that is,
the Resident Native Labour Ordinance (RNLO) and the Registration of Natives
Ordinance (also known as the ‘pass law’). These laws would make the shift to
high-value cash crops even more profitable.
In 1919, the RNLO was passed and prohibited fixed-rent tenancy. The 1919
ordinance and those that followed drastically altered tenants’ rights. Prior to the
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Table 4: Agricultural calendar for Kikuyu grown crops and coffee
Activity/month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Kikuyu grown -
cereal crops Harvest short rain
crops (e.g. maize)
Long rains Harvest long rain crops
Plant short rain crops
Oct: Circumcision
Plant crops for long rains
(e.g. maize, beans, potatoes)
Settler grown
coffee Prune Coffee harvest
Kikuyu grown
wattle bark Wattle bark stripping Wattle bark stripping
Sources: For Kikuyu grown crops see the Native Affairs Department annual report 1924: 49; Kenyatta 1938; Sticther 1982. For coffee and wattle bark see the









ordinance, the African tenants were able to negotiate fairly good conditions; some
would work a limited number of days in return for tenancy, while others paid rent.
The area of land for grazing and cultivation was at least 5 to 6 acres, and a family
could own and maintain large herds of livestock (Furedi 1972; Stichter 1982).
However, following the 1919 ordinance, tenants were no longer allowed to pay
rent in cash and were instead turned into ‘rent labourers’. A male tenant would
have to give a minimum of 90 days’ work per year and, in return, receive a low
30-day ticket wage.20 Then, in the late 1930s, the 1919 ordinance was augmented
to provide settlers with even greater control over the tenants. Consequently, the
number of work days increased to 240–270 days per year. At the same time, the
area of land for cultivation decreased to one acre and the number of livestock to
a maximum of 10–15 sheep. Settlers’ control over tenants was further strengthened
by the decision to shift the responsibility of overseeing tenant ordinances from the
colonial administration to settler-dominated district councils. Further, no compen-
sation was offered to offset the income loss from the restricted cultivation and
livestock.
An important question to explore here is why the tenants did not return to the
reserves despite the worsening conditions. The tenants had after all voluntarily
entered into contracts with the settlers and as we argue an increased commerciali-
zation was taking place in the Kikuyu reserves. First of all, tenants who could
return did so. In 1928, the Agricultural Census presented for the first time the
number of residents, of whom 32,969 were male tenants (Kenya Colony 1928). In
1936, due to the outmigration of tenants, this number declined to 24,872 (Kenya
Colony 1936). However, not all tenants could return. One of the few studies on
Kikuyu tenants is Furedi’s (1989), which found that the Kikuyu land rights
system was central to tenants’ ability to return to the reserves. Some tenants lost
their land rights, often to other family members, while they were away from the
reserves. A large proportion had never owned land and lived as ahoi (labour
tenant or serf, Kikuyu) on Kikuyu landowners’ farms prior to migrating to Euro-
pean land. A smaller proportion cited bad relationships with the chiefs as a reason
for not returning to the reserves.21
Due to the immobility of the remaining tenants, settlers could extract a higher
number of work days. The ability to use tenants as semi-permanent labour ensured
a timely supply of labour that could be called upon when needed drastically lower-
ing the transaction costs of finding labour. Despite this, the supply of labour was
still insufficient. This was particularly the case for the burgeoning coffee sector
and during the harvest season, short-term workers from nearby reserves were
hired to fill the gap. On the one hand, employing short-term labour during peak
seasons allowed for easier monitoring since they were hired to perform specific
20 The 30-day ticket wage for tenants was, on average, half of the 30-day ticket wage for a wage
worker.
21 See Furedi 1989 and Lonsdale 1992.
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tasks. On the other, unlike migrant or tenant workers, local short-term labour could
easily desert the farm, leading to high contract enforcement costs. As a result,
strong penalties were enforced as part of the labour contracts under the pass laws
implemented in 1921, which forbade Africans from leaving the reserves without a
passport. The pass, commonly referred to as kipande (card, Kiswahili), listed per-
sonal details, previous employer, and the wage earned. The system enabled the
settler community to better control the wage level and to retain workers more
easily since deserters could be traced. We reference data on the number of deserters
to illustrate the effectiveness of the law in reducing transaction costs. In 1921, when
the law was implemented, 3595 deserters were reported. Of these, 77% were pun-
ished under the new law. However, in the year following the implementation,
only 149 cases were reported (Leys 1924). Importantly, while the deserter
problem did not disappear with the implementation of the law,22 its levels did
not increase to those prior to 1921.
The decrease in transaction costs was not the only ‘advantage’ of the restricted
mobility of Africans. Lowered mobility also implied a reduction in the bargaining
power of the African worker as settlers were faced with less competition to recruit
and retain workers placing a downward pressure on nominal wages. The stabiliz-
ation of the wage combined with the steady supply of cheap tenant labour
lowered the wage bill. With the shift to high-value cash crops raising the value of
the output per worker, settlers could capture a higher share of the surplus value.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Literature on Africa’s economic developments has cited the presence of settler agri-
culture to explain past and present low living standards and high inequality in
Africa’s former settler economies. In the 1970s, a consensus emerged among
‘radical’ scholars that to expand settler agriculture the colonial state intervened
in the markets for land and labour to ensure the settlers a steady supply of cheap
labour. More specifically, land tenure policies and taxation eroded earnings from
the sales of African produce creating unlimited supplies of labour at low wages.
This interpretation of labour supply in settler economies has influenced a new
strain of literature that seeks to explain long-run poverty, inequality, and political
instability in Africa. However, the ‘radical’ literature suffered from empirical short-
comings and failed to directly link the introduction of various labour policies to the
performance of the settler agricultural sector. Consequently, we are not able to
know whether declines in African wages can be attributed to colonial policies or
to contractions in the settler farm economy. We contribute to the historical
22 Correspondence from the Chief Registrar of Natives revealed that, in the 1940s, the government
remained active in tracing deserters and in issuing warrants of arrest (Kikuyu Province 1934–
48)
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literature on labour in settler economies by empirically investigating the underlying
causes of the expansion of settler agriculture using Kenya as a case.
To examine whether colonial policies facilitated the expansion of settler agri-
culture, we calculate both settler farm earnings and African real wages. The two
measures reveal a paradox: settler profitability and employment rose while
African real wages declined. To examine the role of colonial policies, we correlate
the two measures with taxation and developments in the local African agricultural
economy. Doing so, we do not find support for the classic interpretation that
declines in African agriculture and taxation can explain the steady supply of
labour at low wages. On the contrary, we find that the bulk of labour came from
native reserves becoming increasingly more commercialized in the period. A com-
bination of seasonality and deeper integration with the cash economy seem to
explain a majority of the labour supply.
The rise in settler profitability can instead be explained by a shift to high-value
cash crop production coinciding with tightened labour control. The shift to coffee
and tea raised the value of output per worker, yet this did not manifest itself in
higher wages. This can be explained by the emergence of a labour control regime
that placed downward pressures on both transaction costs and wages enabling
the settler to capture a higher share of surplus value. Our results conquer with
past and present literature that has linked poverty and declining living standards
to the expansion of settler agriculture. Our findings need not be unique to
Kenya. Similar measures were taken to reduce labour mobility in for instance
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (see e.g. Nattrass 1991; Rennie 1978) and
we propose that these measures might have played a more important role than pol-
icies to raise labour supply. Still, more research on labour control and settler agri-
culture is needed to understand not only the political economy of settler farming in
Africa but also to explore how white settlement affected the economic opportunities
and freedoms of the indigenous African populations.
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Where possible, we refer to district wages and/or sector-specific wages as opposed to
the more superficial wage data in the Blue Books. For the years for which we have
district- or sector-specific data, we estimate the weighted (by employment share)
average wages. District wage data is available in the Native Affairs Department’s
annual reports for years 1923–25, 1927, 1928, 1930, and 1936. For 1920, 1921,
1933, 1934, and 1937–39, we use nationwide data on agricultural wages also
from the Native Affairs Department’s annual report. We employ data from the
Blue Books for 1926 and the Labour Department’s annual report for 1944 and 1945.
Where we have reported minimum and maximum wages, we calculate averages
using a log-normal distribution that assigns greater weight to the lower value. For
missing values, we interpolate data using the log annual difference (growth/decline)
and then add the percentage to each year: ln (y1/y0)/n. Years 1922–25 are interp-
olated using a log-linear formula. Note that female wages are unavailable at the dis-
trict level. At the national level, nevertheless, we use data on female wages for 1927,
1928, 1938, and 1955 from the annual reports for the Native Affairs Department
and the Labour Department. For the remaining years, we estimate the female
wages, assuming a constant male–female wage ratio. Juvenile wages are available
for 1901–02 from the Blue Books and for 1927, 1928, 1938, and 1955 from the
annual reports of the Native Affairs Department and Labour Department. For
the remaining years, we estimate the juvenile wages, assuming a constant male–
juvenile wage ratio.
Tenant wage
Data on tenant male wages are taken from the Native Affairs Department’s annual
report for 1927–29, 1933–39, and 1944. For 1921–26, we extrapolate by assuming a
constant ratio for male 30-day ticket wages to male tenant wages. We do not have a
wage for female tenants and we estimate the wage using the male-to-female 30-day
ticket wage ratio.
Daily wage
We lack data for daily paid (casual) wages. To solve, we estimate daily wages by
dividing the lowest 30-day ticket wage (excluding ratios) by 30 days.
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Food allowances
We include the value of food in our total wage measure. Food allowances are taken
from Mosley (1983) for the years 1913, 1925–33 and 1945. Information for 1934 is
taken from the Agricultural Department annual report. We assume that the value of
food allowance was held constant for the years where no change is reported.
Employment
Data on male, female, and juvenile workers employed on 30-day tickets are taken
from the Agricultural Census for 1921–34, 1936, 1938, 1941, 1942, 1944, and
1945. Data for 1937 are from the Blue Books. We interpolate data on male
workers for 1935, 1939, and 1940; female workers for 1935–44; and juvenile
workers for 1935–42.
Production costs: fertilizers and insecticides
We use import values for fertilizers and insecticides, the data for which are taken
from the annual trade reports for 1921–45. A 20% mark-up is added to arrive at
retail prices.
Agricultural machinery and tools
Data on agricultural tools and machinery are taken from the annual trade reports
for 1921–45. A 20% mark-up is added to arrive at retail prices.
Transport costs
Railway rates and distance measures from the railhead to Mombasa are taken from
the Kenya Railways Corporation’Administration Reports. The files are available at
the Kenya National Archives. The railway rates for maize are taken from the Colo-
nial Office’s annual report for 1920, van Zwanenberg (1975) for 1927, and Mosley
(1983) for 1933 and 1943.
Railway rates were generally reported when a rate decrease or increase was
implemented; thus, the rates are not available for all years. Nevertheless, it seems
fair to assume that the railway rates remained constant for the years in which no
new rate was introduced.
Rural prices
The national colonial records provide only urban retail prices. To collect rural
prices for the calculation of African real wages, we collect data from the provincial
and district annual reports from the most populated regions (Kikuyu and
Nyanza), which also supplied a majority of the labour. We lack the rural price
data for imported goods (i.e. sugar, salt, soap, and kerosene) and are therefore
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unable to calculate a rural–urban price difference for these goods. Nevertheless,
data from Uganda (see de Haas 2017) have confirmed that the prices for imported
goods were similar between the rural and urban areas. Consequently, we use the
urban retail series for all imported goods: beef, cotton, sugar, salt, petroleum, and
soap.
APPENDIX 2
Earnings calculation for the settler agricultural sector
To calculate settler agricultural earnings (‘profitability’), we use the standard prin-











Total revenue is calculated by multiplying production values with producer prices.
Production values are generally available for coffee, wheat, and maize, which con-
stituted 60% of the production value. We rely on reported export values for the
remaining crops. Depending on the crop, this could lead to both the under- and
overestimation of true earnings. We overestimate the earnings for crops sold in
the overseas markets. Further, our values for true earnings are underestimated for
domestically sold and exported crops (e.g. sugar) because we are unable to
account for domestic sales. We deduct a 15% mark-up from the export values.
This mark-up is based on the calculated transaction costs (the difference between
the sales price in Nairobi and London) for coffee and sisal which included
storage in Mombasa, insurance, and sea freight to London. This measure is conser-
vative as it overestimates the transaction costs for crops sold domestically or region-
ally. We use the production values of the following crops: coffee, maize, and wheat.
We use export values for tea, sisal, sugar, pyrethrum, coconut, beans, and potatoes.
In performing a robustness check, we calculate the earnings using only the export
values.
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Wages
To obtain the annual wage bill, we multiply wages by employment figures for all
categories of agricultural workers. If data for minimum and maximum wages are
reported, we calculate an average using lognormal distribution (biased towards
the minimum).
We calculate the wage bills for the following categories of workers:
. male, female, and juvenile workers employed on 30-day ticket contracts;
. male, female, and juvenile workers employed on tenant contracts; and
. male, female, and juvenile workers employed as daily workers.
30-day ticket workers
We multiply the number of 30-day ticket workers employed each year by the stated
30-day ticket wage.
Tenants
For tenants, we lack information on the number of days worked per year. Thus, to
assign an annual number of work days, we use the number of days that a tenant is
required to work as per the Resident Native Labour Ordinances (RNLO): 90 days
from 1921 to 1939 and 270 days thereafter. Secondary sources have suggested that
the wives and children of male tenants would also work during the harvest and
planting seasons. Thus, we assign 60 days of work per year for this group of
workers (see the Labour Department’s annual report 1945).
Daily workers
We multiply the number of daily labourers employed each year with the estimated
daily wage.
Production costs
Apart from labour, production costs included those for fertilizers and insecticides.
We deduct the total annual value of these costs.
Depreciation expense
Depreciation expenses are calculated from the total value of agricultural machinery
and tools.
We deduct the cost of acquiring fixed agricultural assets by subtracting a depre-
ciation rate. We use a straight line depreciation formula. The lifetime of agricultural
machinery is set to four years, which is consistent with the contemporary lifespans
used in accounting for African countries (see Ernst & Young 2017). See the follow-
ing example:
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Assuming the purchase cost of machinery is £50,000,
4 years of useful life = 25% depreciation rate per year
25% depreciation rate * £50,000 = £12,500 annual depreciation.
Transport costs
We calculate the costs of transporting goods from the railhead in a given district to
Kilindini Harbour in Mombasa. We estimate transport costs for the following
crops: coffee, maize, beans, cotton, sugar, tea, wheat, barley, oats, potatoes, sisal,
and pyrethrum.
To account for the different locations of settler farms, we calculate transport
costs as a weighted sum (by quantity in a given area). The transport costs are
first calculated at the district level, as follows:
Transport costd= railway ratec * distanced * production volumecd,
where c = crop and d = district.
Next, we calibrate the district-level transport costs to arrive at a single trans-
port cost for the entire sector. To calculate the weighted averages, for all years,
we use data on European production by district, distance measure, and railway
rate for each crop. Data on European production at the district level are available
only for 1920, 1922, 1930, 1934, and 1936. We use three steps to estimate the pro-
duction volumes per district for the missing years. First, we calculate crop shares by
district for the years in which data are available. Second, we interpolate data for the
missing years to determine the district-level crop shares for all years. Finally, we use
the total production volume at the national level and the estimated crop shares at
the district level to assign production volumes to each district. Owing to the lack
of data, we are unable to calculate the costs of transporting from the farm gate
to the railhead.
The total annual transport costs, on average, were 6% of the total production
value, which is marginally lower than that in landlocked Nyasaland, where trans-
port costs were 10%, a rate that has been said to be the highest in Southern
Africa (Bolt & Green 2015).
Other transaction costs
Other transaction costs include grading, packing, and port charges. But the data
on such costs are generally not available except for maize and coffee. For maize,
these costs amounted to 0.5% of the total production value. For coffee, on the
other hand, the transaction costs were substantially higher (5% of the production
value). To implement a conservative measure, we deduct 5% from the production
values.
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For coffee, we also deduct curing charges which were 80 Ksh. per ton in 1920-
34 and 55 Ksh. per ton in 1935–45.
APPENDIX 3
Welfare ratio estimation
Real wages or welfare ratios are calculated using Allen’s (2009, 2015) method,
which entails computing annual wages and dividing them by the annual costs of
maintaining a family. Free food and housing was an important non-wage com-
ponent. We include the value of food allowances in the total income measure but
due to lack of data we are not able to include the value of housing. The omission
of housing values implies a slight underestimation of the true income.
A welfare ratio of one indicates that the sole income earner earns just enough
to keep his/her family alive. While a welfare ratio greater than one suggests that
the family can afford luxury goods or a higher consumption of basic goods, a
ratio of less than one means that the family cannot afford a decent living stan-
dard under the stated assumptions. The barebones consumption basket assigns
2100 calories per day to each household member as the recommended daily
protein intake (see WHO 1985). We follow Allen (2015) and use a scaling
factor of four to calculate a family subsistence basket. A factor of four provides
sufficient calories for the survival of an adult working male, a female working in
smallholder agriculture, and 2–3 young children. The basket includes minimal
amounts of fuel, lightning, soap, and cloth. We collect data on food diet
habits from the comprehensive Oltersdorf Collection (Raschke-Cheema et al.
2008; Raschke 2009). The Collection comprises more than 70 unique nutrition
surveys conducted by the Max Planck Institute during 1930–60. The surveys
showed that the average intake of calories per day in colonial Kenya was
2200–2300 calories, of which 60–80 g were from protein sources. Thus, our bare-
bones basket of 2100 calories per day and 63–71 g of protein seems reasonable.
We include the cheapest staple foods that still offered the minimum level of cal-
ories and protein. In the early colonial period, millet and sorghum were the main
staple foods, although certain areas had shifted to maize. We use the ‘cheapest
of ’ method (see de Haas 2017) and thus allow households to substitute
between the cheapest options of maize, millet, or sorghum. The Collections
showed that households consumed a low level of animal protein (6–8 g) and
obtained the rest of their proteins from legumes. Therefore, we include beans
as a protein source and only a small amount of meat. We select coconut oil
for cooking oil, candles for lightning, and kerosene for fuel. As we lack data
on candles and firewood, we follow Frankema and van Waijenburg (2012) and
raise the cost of the basket by 10%. We raise the basket by an additional 5%
to account for the cost of maintaining a rural dwelling.
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Cheapest of Calories Protein Calories Protein
Maize lb 414 1601 42 1815 48
Millet lb 424 1547 47 1815 55
Sorghum lb 419 1565 49 1815 56
Beans lb 44 1510 107 182 13
Beef lb 6.6 522 100 9 2
Coconut oil lb 6.6 4010 0 73 0










Sources: de Haas 2017; Frankema and van Waijenburg 2012. For nutrition values, we refer to Latham
1997 and WHO 1985.

















































1901 11.5 6.8 9.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 3.0
1902 11.5 6.8 9.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 3.0
1903 9.0 7.0 9.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 3.2
1904 13.0 10.9 12.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 3.8
1905 13.0 11.8 12.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 4.5
1906 13.0 12.8 12.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.3
1907 13.0 12.8 12.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.3
1908 13.0 12.8 12.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.3
1909 13.0 12.6 12.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.2
1910 14.7 13.8 12.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 6.2
1911 14.3 13.5 12.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 6.0
1912 13.9 13.9 12.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 6.3
1913 16.4 13.9 12.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 6.3
1914 15.8 13.9 12.9 0.4 0.2 0.2 6.3
1915 15.9 14.0 13.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 6.3
1916 16.0 14.0 13.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 6.4
1917 15.0 13.5 13.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 6.0
1918 15.0 13.5 13.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 6.0
1919 15.0 13.5 13.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 6.0
1920 15.0 13.5 13.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 6.0
1921 17.0 14.5 13.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 6.8
1922 17.5 14.7 13.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 7.0
1923 18.0 15.0 13.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 7.2
1924 20.0 15.9 13.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 8.0
1925 21.4 14.2 10.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 8.5
1926 17.2 15.0 10.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 9.2
1927 17.2 15.0 10.9 0.4 0.3 0.2 9.8
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1928 17.2 15.0 10.9 0.4 0.3 0.2 8.5
1929 14.8 14.0 11.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 8.4
1930 20.5 14.0 11.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 7.7
1931 18.0 12.6 11.6 0.3 0.3 0.2 7.1
1932 15.0 11.1 11.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 6.5
1933 12.7 10.2 12.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 6.0
1934 12.5 9.9 11.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.5
1935 14.0 9.9 11.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 5.0
1936 12.5 9.9 11.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 5.3
1937 16.5 11.1 11.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 5.7
1938 13.8 10.9 11.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 5.7
1939 13.8 11.3 11.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 8.4
1940 13.9 11.6 11.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 8.2
1941 13.9 12.0 10.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 8.1
1942 14.0 12.3 10.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 8.0
1943 14.0 12.7 10.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 7.9
1944 16.6 13.6 14.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 7.7
1945 24.6 21.0 20.8 0.3 0.3 0.6 8.5
1946 23.0 22.9 18.0 0.3 0.4 0.6 7.7
1947 25.0 22.9 18.7 0.4 0.4 0.7 9.0
1948 28.0 22.9 29.1 0.9 0.4 0.7 14.0
1949 27.5 25.0 26.3 0.3 0.4 0.8 13.4
1950 26.9 27.4 20.0 0.5 0.5 0.9 14.6
1951 32.3 30.1 26.6 0.5 0.5 0.9 15.9
1952 38.8 33.3 37.5 0.6 0.6 1.0 17.3
1953 42.0 35.2 30.5 1.0 0.6 1.1 18.6
1954 51.4 35.9 42.9 1.3 0.6 1.2 19.5
1955 62.9 47.9 47.9 1.7 1.3 1.3 20.5
1956 62.9 47.9 47.9 1.7 1.3 1.3 21.5
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1957 67.3 47.9 50.6 1.9 1.3 1.3 22.6
1958 61.9 56.7 57.5 1.9 1.4 1.3 23.8
1959 57.0 50.8 58.0 1.9 1.4 1.4 25.0
1960 60.6 53.0 51.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 26.3
1961 60.3 52.8 46.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 27.6
1962 60.0 52.6 42.0 1.2 1.5 1.5 29.0
1963 62.5 55.6 38.1 1.0 1.6 1.5 30.5



















































1920 53,709 45,005 3,917 4,787 111,150 39,098 35,491 36,561
1921 67,388 55,938 4,911 6,539 110,891 38,274 35,213 37,405
1922 61,949 51,753 4,261 5,935 110,672 37,467 34,938 38,268
1923 70,957 54,406 6,609 9,942 110,492 36,677 34,664 39,151
1924 87,093 66,993 8,316 11,784 110,351 35,903 34,393 40,055
1925 78,527 61,735 5,477 11,315 110,250 35,146 34,124 40,980
1926 94,611 74,873 6,021 13,717 110,188 34,405 33,857 41,926
1927 97,068 76,838 5,000 15,000 110,165 33,679 33,592 42,894 5,006
1928 104,949 83,000 4,654 17,295 110,182 32,969 33,329 43,884 9,371
1929 105,040 85,082 4,654 15,304 112,000 32,032 32,928 47,040 6,092
1930 112,728 90,633 3,971 18,124 119,849 34,378 35,230 50,241 13,157
1931 112,636 89,856 3,387 19,393 110,413 30,906 32,550 46,957 7,574
1932 98,194 79,604 3,260 15,330 110,570 30,247 32,294 48,029 5,926
1933 97,865 79,749 3,506 14,610 114,440 30,933 33,383 50,124 7,160
1934 100,190 81,883 3,536 14,771 104,372 28,939 31,035 44,398 6,685
1935 100,544 84,549 3,699 16,487 98,647 26,829 28,898 42,920 15,449
1936 100,900 87,302 3,869 18,401 93,112 24,872 26,908 41,492 11,178 10,904 8,786
1937 106,300 90,145 4,047 20,539 85,860 24,555 25,008 36,297 12,316 11,835 9,214


































































1939 107,741 96,112 4,429 25,586 73,311 23,932 21,602 27,778 14,952 13,941 10,134
1940 104,109 99,241 4,633 28,558 68,003 23,627 20,077 24,300 16,474 15,131 10,627
1941 100,600 102,473 4,846 31,875 63,242 23,325 18,660 21,258 18,151 16,422 11,145
1942 122,500 106,249 5,069 35,577 59,641 23,702 17,342 18,596 2,036 13,737 5,366
1943 120,229 98,010 5,302 35,408 59,143 26,757 16,118 16,268 1,913 9,924 3,310
1944 118,000 98,169 5,547 36,201 65,852 34,656 15,981 15,215 1,738 9,377 2,876
1945 118,300 99,924 5,802 34,487 34,188 31,930 13,542 13,144 2,133 6,593 2,525
1946 137,821 90,541 8,932 38,348 31,930 27,746 14,045 7,754 3,288 9,296 3,268
1947 139,116 93,439 9,193 36,484 37,000 16,625 9,087 7,888 4,983 13,015 4,399
1948 136,854 94,539 10,728 31,587 40,795 25,359 8,739 6,697 3,944 8,324 2,633
1949 140,775 100,358 12,516 27,901 43,480 27,916 9,470 6,094 2,478 8,365 1,816
1950 143,432 100,510 14,228 28,694 48,075 27,690 9,960 10,425 8,492 6,730 3,655
1951 149,094 105,045 14,449 29,600 41,953 25,522 9,633 6,798 7,196 14,074 4,699
1952 149,823 105,957 15,092 28,774 44,524 27,445 9,989 7,090 5,911 11,820 3,761
1953 165,157 112,719 23,280 29,158 42,963 26,951 8,582 7,430 4,418 13,973 4,219
1954 220,134 133,727 48,329 38,078 44,655 26,300 11,228 7,127
1955 226,523 139,553 52,680 37,551 40,292 24,200 9,256 6,836
1956 233,097 145,633 57,423 37,032 37,511 27,600 7,630 6,557
1957 249,979 151,978 61,481 36,520 34,380 25,700 6,290 6,290
1958 246,072 157,349 60,739 27,984 31,510 21,000 4,726 2,688
1959 248,126 160,446 61,929 25,751 28,880 21,065 5,005 2,666
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